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The military pensions system has recently been the subject of  wide- 
spread criticism.  The Congressional Budget Office, the General Ac- 
counting Office, the Office of the Actuary in the Department of Defense, 
the Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military  Compensation (QRMC V), 
the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (the Grace Com- 
mission), and countless other private and public researchers have re- 
cently examined the military pensions system. All have found that the 
system constitutes a substantial obligation of future payments by tax- 
payers. These investigations have suggested minor to sweeping changes 
in the form, level, availability, timing, and composition of military re- 
tirement benefits. 
As the Grace Commission report notes rather caustically, the military 
retirement system (MRS) has been remarkably resistant to change. In 
spite of the great volume of  studies examining it and relatively wide 
agreement about some of  the principal weaknesses of  the system, no 
major change has been made in  the system in the last two decades. 
Serious change may, however, be at hand. Proposals for substantial 
modifications likely to attract congressional and taxpayer notice have 
been put forward. 
There are two quite different reasons to look closely at the MRS. 
First, and most important, it  provides  a considerable fraction-fully 
30 percent-of the total compensation paid to military personnel. Pen- 
sion rights are an additional 60 percent markup over basic cash salary 
payments. Since only about 15 percent of armed forces members ac- 
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tually collect pensions, the pensions component of  compensation for 
those who do collect is an even larger fraction of total pay. 
In addition to its size, the pensions part of military compensation is 
important because its pattern of accrual over the employee’s working 
life is quite different from the pattern of salaries. The MRS provides 
no regular retirement benefits to those who leave with fewer than twenty 
years of  service. The relatively generous benefits paid to people who 
work longer than twenty years, however, provide a considerable in- 
centive to stay in the service. The benefits also increase substantially 
if  the career is extended beyond twenty years. In this case, however, 
the annuity is received for fewer retirement years. Moreover, options 
to work outside the military are reduced because fewer years remain 
in which to build a second career. This is a complex trade-off to make, 
and one of the principal components of the trade is determined by the 
level and structure of  pension benefit accrual. 
Since it both constitutes a large fraction of total compensation and 
is accrued in a very different time pattern than the rest of compensation, 
we can expect that the MRS has a substantial impact upon the retention, 
and, conceivably, the recruitment of  military personnel. Indeed, it is 
fair to observe, as the Office of the Actuary did recently, that  “The 
military retirement system is not an old-age pension system normally 
found  in  the  private  sector. . . . Rather, it  is a  system specifically 
designed to complement the management of the active force, and is a 
function of  the military pay and allowance compensation structure.” 
(Department of  Defense  1983,  1). The MRS is  said to be explicitly 
designed to help the military keep the right people, minimize the costs 
of retraining, and maintain an effective fighting force. What incentives 
does it provide-and  at what expense? Alternative proposals should 
be examined in light of the changes they would induce in the retirement 
incentive structure. As we shall find, the MRS represents a very large 
public investment in retention. Would the same funds spent in different 
ways have more impact on strengthening the nation’s defenses? 
The second  reason  to examine the MRS is  that its obligations to 
provide  retirement income are not  backed  by  any financial assets. 
These obligations are commitments to pay and represent a considerable 
dedication of future tax or other revenues. These obligations represent 
real claims-taxpayers  and government officials should know their ap- 
proximate magnitude. This knowledge would provide a more accurate 
reflection of  the “financial condition”  of the government-that  is, a 
more accurate accounting to taxpayers of one of  their  major future 
obligations.2 It might also have an important impact on current deci- 
sions. A better estimate of the current equivalent salary cost of pension 
promises being rendered will give us a better estimate of the true cost 
of labor to the armed services. Such estimates are necessary to assess 
labor-saving capital investment correctly. 49  Debt and Structure of Military Pensions 
This chapter examines these issues. It begins with a description of 
the current armed forces retirement system with respect to the incen- 
tives it  provides for retention and its costs, both current and accu- 
mulated. Next, the most widely discussed proposed alternative, that 
advanced by the Grace Commission, is examined against the backdrop 
of the current system. The concluding section provides some sugges- 
tions about what else we need to know before sweeping revision of the 
MRS can be contemplated with confidence about its impacts. 
3.1  The Current System 
In 1636 the Pilgrims adopted the first military retirement system in 
North America. It provided benefits to those disabled in military ser- 
vice. Disability compensation and retirement systems (initially based 
on need) were introduced from time to time for the veterans of a specific 
conflict. Thus, indigent Revolutionary War veterans were covered by 
a system authorized in 1818; this system was modified in 1832 to provide 
payments regardless of need-or, perhaps, in recognition of universal 
need. Veterans of other wars were similarly treated, but each system 
was separately legislated. In 1870, in the process of restructuring the 
Union army as a peacetime force, Congress established a retirement 
system providing an annuity of  75  percent  of  base pay  for retirees 
voluntarily withdrawing after thirty years’ service. With minor elabo- 
rations, the combination of  these two figures is still a central feature 
of the MRS.3 
The current MRS is a “defined benefit” plan providing disability and 
retirement benefits determined by a benefit formula. Members receive 
service credits of 2.5 percent per year of  service, with a maximum of 
75 percent. The retirement annuity is the average salary in the highest- 
paid three years of work times accumulated benefit  credit^.^ Voluntary 
retirement benefits are available after twenty years of service. Thus, a 
retiree with twenty-five years of service is eligible to receive an annuity 
of  .025  x  25  = .625 times his or her average pay in the highest-paid 
three years of  service. These benefits have until recently been fully 
protected  against  increases  in the  cost of  living through  an  annual 
adjustment equal to the change in the CPI over the preceding twelve 
 month^.^ No contributions are made by employees, and the system is 
entirely unfunded; Congress authorizes payment each year on a pay- 
as-you-go basis.6 Members of the armed services pay Social Security 
taxes and may receive Social Security benefits; these are independent 
of the MRS. 
As of September 1982, 2.1 million full-time active-duty military em- 
ployees were drawing annual salaries of $27.3 billion. The MRS sup- 
ported  1.2 million nondisability and 142,000 disability annuitants col- 
lecting payments of  $13.9 billion and $1.4 billion respectively. In addition, 50  Herman B. Leonard 
about 950,000 part-time reservists earned $2.2 billion in salaries. Re- 
servists can also qualify for retirement benefits, though on a less gen- 
erous basis than full-time members of the armed services. 
This is a very generous retirement system. A rapid buildup of benefits 
(service credits of  2.5 percent per year), fully inflation-adjusted  an- 
nuities, and no employee contribution would by themselves be a very 
substantial addition to compensation. But in a profession where careers 
can start at eighteen years of age or even younger, the provision of full 
immediate lifetime annuities after only twenty years of service means 
that many armed services personnel collect retirement benefits for longer 
than they worked. 
The early availability of full lifetime inflation-protected benefits con- 
tributes to making this system a very important-and  expensive-form 
of military  Compensation.  The average age at retirement is between 
forty and forty-five  years, which gives the annuitant a long life ex- 
pectancy over which to enjoy the benefits of his or her service to the 
nation. Of course, given military pay schedules, the retirement pay by 
itself does not generally provide a lavish life-style. The average enlisted 
retiree with twenty years service in  1982 was entitled to a pension of 
about $9,000 per year-roughly  at the poverty line for a family of four. 
3.1.1  Incentive Effects 
How is an armed service employee paid over the course of his or 
her career? Pension benefits are a substantial part of pay. To evaluate 
them and  their incentive  effects, we must first convert the pension 
benefits that will be received later into an equivalent current amount, 
known as the pension wealth of the employee. Changes in the pension 
wealth from one year to the next are a part of c~mpensation.~  As an 
illustration, we can compute the base pay, other compensation (quarters 
allowance, commissary and medical benefits, and so on), pension com- 
pensation, and total compensation  for an armed services employee who 
enters the military at age twenty-two with a base pay of $15,000. This 
individual  can retire  with  full benefits  at age forty-two or after; we 
assume he or she will live to be seventy-five. Other compensation can 
be estimated as 35 percent of base pay, an assumption also used by 
the Office of the Actuary. Computation of pension wealth requires that 
we  stipulate  a  real  rate of return on riskless  assets.  Since our first 
interest is in the cost of the compensation provided, we first apply a  1 
percent real rate of return in the figures presented here. This rate is 
consistent with the assumptions adopted by the Office of the Actuary. 
The calculations are carried out in real terms; inflation enters only as 
a result of the three-year final salary averaging in the determination of 
benefits. In this example, inflation is taken to be the Office of  Man- 
agement and Budget stipulated rate of 5 percent. The rate of real salary 51  Debt and Structure of Military Pensions 
growth across the employee’s working life is taken to be  4  percent 
annually, of which 3.5 percent is from longevity increases (estimated 
from the existing distribution of military salaries), and 0.5 percent is 
an assumed rate  of  real general  schedule wage increase.  These are 
roughly consistent with the experience of the last three decades. 
Table 3.1 presents the cost of base pay, other benefits, pension com- 
pensation, and total compensation earned by the employee in various 
years of his or her career. The results are dramatic. Over the first twenty 
years of  the employee’s career, his or her salary and other benefits 
increase in real terms from about $20,000 to almost $45,000. During 
this period, no pension compensation is earned because the employee’s 
claims in the pension system do not begin until the twentieth year of 
service. Yet the cost to the taxpayer, in equivalent current dollars, of 
the increment to pension wealth in the twenty-first year of service is 
just under $22,000, nearly 50 percent of salary and other fringe benefit 
compensation paid in that year. Over the course of the next ten working 
years, the annual increment to pension wealth gradually drops to about 
$15,000. The employee’s salary is increasing every year, in spite of the 
gradual reduction in pension compensation, and reaches $81,000 in the 
last year the employee could normally work.8 Total compensation thus 
increases in  real terms by nearly  a factor of four across a working 
Table 3.1  Annual Cost of  Base Pay,  Other Compensation, and Pension 
Compensation for an Illustrative Military Employee 
Pension  Total 
Age  Base Pay  Other Pay  Compensationa  Compensation 
~~  ~~ 
22  15.0  5.3  0.0  20.3 
32  22.2  7.8  0.0  30.0 
42  32.9  11.5  0.0  44.4 
43  34.2  12.0  21.8  67.9 
44  35.5  12.4  21.6  69.6 
45  37.0  12.9  21.4  71.3 
46  38.4  13.5  21.0  72.9 
47  40.0  14.0  20.4  74.4 
48  41.6  14.6  19.8  75.9 
49  43.3  15.1  18.9  77.3 
50  45.0  15.7  17.9  78.7 
51  46.8  16.4  16.7  79.9 
52  48.7  17.0  15.3  81 .o 
Source: Author’s calculations. See text for assumptions. 
Nora:  All figures given in thousands of inflation-adjusted dollars. These figures give the 
value of compensation in the year in which it is received. They are denominated in real 
terms. 
aAssumes a 1  percent real rate of discount to reflect government cost rather than value 
to the employee. 52  Herman B. Leonard 
career of  thirty  years; on average,  real  compensation increases by 
nearly 5 percent annually. As table 3.1 makes clear, the total current 
equivalent cost of military compensation is heavily stacked toward the 
end of the service  person’s working career. While the effect on retention 
is not obvious, the direction is clear enough: the military compensation 
system (including the MRS) incurs a substantial fraction of  the cost of 
compensation for long-term armed services personnel in the last years 
of their careers. 
Whether or not this system provides  an incentive for service per- 
sonnel to continue working depends upon how they view these benefits, 
and in particular on how they discount the future value of the pensions 
they will receive. Table 3.2  shows the increment to pension wealth for 
the working period between twenty and thirty years of service, in real 
terms, calculated at real interest rates of  1, 3, 6 and 9 percent. These 
increments to pension wealth can be thought of as the value of pension 
compensation granted, as seen from the perspective of the employee, 
assuming various real rates of discount. As Table 3.2 indicates, pension 
earnings constitute a considerable  bonus during the later working years 
if the employee’s personal real discount rate is in the low to moderate 
range of  1 percent to 3 percent. If it is over 6 percent, pension com- 
pensation earned after twenty years of service is small or even nega- 
tive-that  is, the value of the pension as viewed by the employee is 
larger if  it is taken immediately than if he or she works for additional 
years and receives a larger (but also later and shorter) ann~ity.~ 
Table 3.2  Value of  Pension Compensation of Illustrative Employee, 
Computed at Various Discount  Rates 
Annual Discount Rate 
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Source: Author’s calculations. See text for assumptions. 
Notes: All figures are in thousands of inflation-adjusted dollars. These figures give the 
value of compensation in the year in which it is received. They are denominated in real 
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Whether the existing military compensation system promotes reten- 
tion past  the twentieth year of  service, then, turns crucially on the 
employee’s discount rate. One interesting though only suggestive piece 
of evidence is provided by the retirement behavior of previous armed 
services personnel. Only a relatively small fraction continue to serve 
beyond twenty years; the average age of a service person at retirement 
is only forty-three years. This pattern of early retirement could occur 
for any of a host of reasons. A particularly  likely explanation is that 
most  service members  know by the end of twenty years of  service 
whether they are likely to have strong career opportunities thereafter. 
If they are not, then they may well prefer to develop a second career 
outside the military, which many are in a good position to do given 
their training, experience, and the fact that they still have twenty good 
working years in which to do it. Since building a second career becomes 
more and more difficult with additional years of military service (and 
age), many armed service personnel regard twenty years of service as 
a critical decision point. Table 3.2 shows that the MRS is likely to be 
a strong offsetting incentive only if most servicemen and women have 
relatively low real discount rates.  The fact that not many  stay past 
twenty years may  only reflect the good private  sector employment 
opportunities many of them face. It may also indicate a relatively high 
rate of time preference that leads them to prefer an immediate pension. 
These results cast some doubt on the view that the MRS provides a 
strong incentive for military personnel to work past the twentieth year 
of  service when  immediate pension  benefits  become available.  The 
results do not, however, call into question the incentive effect, on either 
recruitment or retention up to the twentieth service year, of having the 
MRS. Table 3.3 shows the value of accrued pension rights to the il- 
lustrative employee discussed earlier for various personal discount rates. 
Even when evaluated at the (high) real discount rate of 6 percent, the 
Table 3.3  Value of  Accrued Pension Rights for the Illustrative Employee, at 
Various Discount  Rates and Ages 
Annual Discount Rates 





412  308  213  157 
490  375  266  199 
615  490  363  28 1 
660  535  404  317 
Source: Author’s calculations. See text for assumptions. 
Notes:  All figures are in thousands of inflation-adjusted dollars. These figures give the 
value ofpension  accruals at various years in the employee’s career. They are denominated 
in real terms. They are reported as present values in the years shown. 54  Herman B. Leonard 
value of pension rights available to our illustrative employee at the end 
of twenty working years is over $200,000.10  The employee gets nothing 
if  he or she leaves before the twentieth year. This $200,000 accrued 
pension right can be viewed, therefore, as a bonus for reaching the 
twentieth year of  service. Even if  armed services personnel discount 
future payments at a very high discount rate, the vesting of pension 
rights  in  the  twentieth  year  constitutes  a  considerable incentive to 
remain in the service to become eligible for retirement. Moreover, the 
$200,000--or more, if  the serviceman or woman discounts the future 
at a lower rate-bonus  payable in the twentieth year, with additional 
bonus payments for service beyond  that,  may  well be an  effective 
recruitment incentive for people considering a long-term military career. 
If  armed service employees discount future pension payments at a 
low rate, the MRS provides an enormous incentive to join and to serve 
for the minimum eligibility twenty years, and a considerable incentive 
to serve beyond that. If  employees discount their future receipts at a 
higher rate (3 percent to 6 percent in real terms), then the MRS still 
provides a strong incentive to join and to serve twenty years, but little 
incentive to serve beyond that. These incentives are achieved, how- 
ever, at considerable cost. In the case of our illustrative employee, the 
cost to taxpayers (using a 1 percent real rate of discount) for providing 
the minimum pension for which the employee qualifies at age forty- 
two is over $400,000. This is a very large addition to the salary and 
other benefits we are paying. 
3.1.2  The Military Pension Debt 
The military retirement system is expensive. While considerable fi- 
nancial commitments to armed forces personnel have been undertaken 
in return for their services, no funds have been set aside to help future 
taxpayers redeem the obligations. The MRS is thus another form of 
the national debt. A  number of  studies, using a variety  of  different 
methodologies, have recently estimated the magnitude of the pension 
debt taxpayers owe to current and future retirees under the MRS. Until 
recently, the Department of Defense funded the retirement system purely 
on a pay-as-you-go basis, with annual appropriations covering each 
year’s benefit payments. Congress recently passed legislation putting 
the MRS on an accrual basis, recognizing a charge in each year that 
reflects the present value of  the cost of the promises extended rather 
than the payments actually made. The consistent application of  such 
a reporting and funding system could make a considerable difference 
in the recognition of  the costs of  military pensions by Congress and 
taxpayers. 
Computing an estimate of the equivalent  current cost of promises 
extended requires the choosing a method of “funding” as well as mak- 55  Debt and Structure of Military Pensions 
ing a variety of economic assumptions. Deciding which funding method 
to use involves choosing which pattern of accrual to recognize across 
the  employee’s working life. All  funding methods  would  recognize 
charges adequate to build a fund by the end of the employee’s working 
career that would, with interest earnings, suffice to pay the pension 
benefits the employee will receive. But such a fund could be built up 
through contributions early, late, or all across the employee’s career. 
Thus, a timing pattern must be chosen. 
The funding method we use here is a common choice. Endorsed in 
proposals to put the MRS on an accrual basis, it is referred to as the 
entry age normal funding method. This approach spreads the cost of 
the pension obligations across the employee’s working career in pro- 
portion to salary payments. If, at a particular point in the career, the 
employee has received one-third  of  the total present  value of wage 
payments that he or she will receive while working, then the entry age 
normal pension-funding method would recognize accrued pension costs 
equal to one-third of the total present value of projected pension pay- 
ments. This fraction of salary, constant across the employee’s career, 
is known as thefullfunding  rate. It represents the proportional markup 
over regular salary payments necessary to cover the cost of  pension 
obligations associated with any given year of  service. It is a simple 
way to characterize how expensive the pension system is relative to 
wages or other benefits. Of course the system has many different em- 
ployees, entering at different ages and with different employment his- 
tories, rates of separation from the service before retirement, and ages 
at retirement. The entry age normal method uses an average funding 
rate which, if applied to all salaries, would be adequate on a statistical 
basis to cover the costs of the pensions that will be received by those 
who stay long enough to receive them.” 
Because the entry age normal method projects the number of pension 
recipients and the pensions they will receive, we need a simulation 
model to analyze the future of the pension system. Results depend on 
the accuracy of projected plan experience, including the rates of dis- 
ability, withdrawal,  retirement,  and  death.  In addition, a variety of 
economic assumptions must be specified, including the anticipated rate 
of increase in salaries (since benefit payments will depend upon future 
salaries), the rate of inflation, and the rate of return on fund “assets,” 
which determines how much must be put aside today to meet (with 
accumulated interest) the pension obligation flowing from this year’s 
service. Since we  ultimately  care about the costs  stated in today’s 
dollars,  the  calculations  are carried  out  in  real-that  is,  inflation- 
adjusted-dollars. This means that we need to specify the real rate of 
increase in salaries and the real rate of return on investments; the rate 
of inflation has only a minor effect on these real-valued calculations.  l2 56  Herman B. Leonard 
It might appear that since the entry age normal method must project 
future events, the value of liabilities to be recognized may depend upon 
future actions. That is, it might appear that the method takes on too 
much, accruing to today the unfunded liabilities for future service, the 
benefits of which have not yet been received. The method avoids this 
pitfall. After accruing to today the cost of all future benefit payments, 
the method subtracts the value of future contributions to the plan as 
if  they were made at the full funding rate. To put it another way, the 
entry age normal method recognizes as liabilities all future benefit pay- 
ments, but recognizes as assets the amount of future full funding that 
would provide for the benefits earned as a result of future work. Thus, 
the future service credits are both added and subtracted under the entry 
age normal method. This leaves the liabilities we should recognize for 
service already completed (net of any assets already put aside, which 
in the case of  the MRS is zero). The entry age normal methodology 
computes exactly what we want, the present value of our present net 
obligations to employees for services already provided. This amount, 
known as the unfunded liability of the system, is an important char- 
acterization of the net debt that taxpayers owe to current and future 
military retirees as a consequence of  services they have already ren- 
dered. It represents an appropriate measure of current obligations. 
The entry age normal method was used to simulate the current system 
as of September 1982, The results are a baseline against which to view 
possible reform proposals. Plan experience rates of retirement, disabil- 
ity, and separation were taken from data published  by  the Defense 
Department Office of the Actuary.  Longevity  salary increases were 
estimated from the existing distribution of average salaries by years of 
experience. The real rate of increase in the general salary schedule was 
estimated from historical data from the past three decades to be about 
0.5 percent per year. The real rate of return on fund assets was taken 
to be 1 percent per year; this return is consistent with returns on low- 
risk investments such as government securities over the preceding three 
decades. These figures are similar to those used by the Office of the 
Actuary in its assessment of the financial condition of the MRS. 
Two minor adjustments in the treatment of disability payments were 
made to capture the full cost of military retirement benefits. Disability 
payments to former armed services personnel are paid out of several 
different budgets. Some veterans with disabilities may elect to receive 
their payments through the Veterans Administration rather than through 
the MRS. Moreover, the military recognizes a distinction between tem- 
porary and permanent disability. In the simulations presented here, we 
treated all disabilities that eventually became permanent as permanent 
from their inception, and included all payments for them (whether by 
the Department of Defense or the VA) as liabilities of the MRS. Second, 57  Debt and Structure of Military Pensions 
since disability payments are tax-exempt, we converted them to pretax 
cash-equivalent payments. l3 The foregone tax payments on disability 
income reduce the Treasury’s income tax receipts. Although the pay- 
ments do not show up in the Defense Department budget, they are 
properly viewed as liabilities of the MRS and have been treated here 
as such. 
The model underestimates the costs associated with the MRS be- 
cause it excludes the medical, commissary, and other ancillary (tax- 
exempt and largely off-budget) benefits enjoyed by retired personnel 
and their dependents. Only cash benefits (and tax benefits in the case 
of disability payments) are included here. Retirement benefits in the 
MRS are computed as a fraction of “basic”  pay; a broader concept, 
known as basic military compensation (BMC), has been developed to 
present a more accurate view of total current compensation offered to 
members of the armed forces. BMC includes the value of some housing, 
medical, commissary, and other benefits. Reference is often made to 
BMC rather than to basic pay when comparing military and civilian 
compensation, and the MRS funding rate is frequently described as a 
fraction of BMC to make it more comparable to the funding rates of 
civilian retirement systems. This convention underestimates the value 
of MRS obligations because it widens the basis of comparison by in- 
cluding the ancillary benefits enjoyed by members of the armed forces 
while they are in the service, without including the continuing medical 
and commissary benefits as part of the retirement  system. Unfortu- 
nately, there are few good estimates available of the value or cost of 
these benefits for retirees, and the usual convention-ignoring  them- 
is therefore followed here as well. 
Table 3.4 presents a summary of the baseline simulation results. 
Valued on an entry age normal basis, the MRS currently represents an 
accumulated liability of over $525 billion. The present value of pay- 
ments that will eventually be made to current annuitants and employees 
is over $665 billion; of this, approximately $140 billion will be paid in 
return for services yet to be rendered. Thus $525 billion is a measure 
of the current value of pension payments to be made in return for work 
already provided. No assets have been put aside as yet to meet this 
obligation. It represents a debt equal to approximately 40 percent of 
the more widely recognized explicit national debt for which the Trea- 
sury must actually borrow funds. Military retirement debt is formed 
merely by the extension of a promise; it requires no appropriation, nor 
is it subject to a debt ceiling like that imposed for the explicit debt. 
MRS debt amounts to approximately $150,000 for each current em- 
ployee and annuitant. Since a relatively small fraction of current em- 
ployees will stay in the service long enough to qualify for retirement 
benefits,  the value of  these claims for each employee who collects 58  Herman B. Leonard 
Table 3.4  Baseline Simulation Results 
Present value of future benefits 
-  Present value of future full funding 
$667.8 billion 
140.3 billion 
= Net unfunded liability 
+ Current annuitants and enrolleesa 




Full Funding Rate 
As Fraction of 
Basic Pay 
As Fraction of 
Basic Military Comp. 
(percent)  (percent) 
Disability  6.3  4.7 
Nondisability  51.3  38.0 
TOTAL  57.6  42.7 
Sources: Data: Department of Defense  1983; results: author’s calculations. 
Assumptions: Plan experience: as reported by the Office of the Actuary. Rates of increase: 
CPI = 5 percent; salaries-general  = 0.5 percent, longevity from plan experience. Real 
rate of return on  assets: 1 percent. 
aExcludes part-time drill reservists. 
benefits is much larger. MRS claims represent a large fraction of the 
accumulated wealth of those who receive or who will qualify for benefits. 
In order to fund the MRS on a current basis, a payment equal to 
nearly  58 percent of basic pay, or 43 percent of BMC, would be re- 
quired. Funding rates of between 10 percent and 20 percent are common 
in private plans, and lower rates are not unusual. Even accounting for 
ancillary benefits to make earnings comparable to gross wages received 
in the private sector, the funding rate required to provide for just the 
cash part of military retirement benefits is substantially higher than 
that of the most generous private plans.I4 The MRS thus represents a 
considerably greater component of compensation than is typical for 
private pension plans. 
3.1.3  The Current System: Summary 
The military compensation system is dominated to an unusual degree 
by its deferred (pensions) component. Only about 15 percent of armed 
services employees will eventually qualify to receive benefits, yet over 
30 percent of military compensation is delivered through the retirement 
system.  This is  an enormous dedication of  public  resources  to the 
nation’s defense. The MRS represents a quietly accumulating com- 
ponent  of the national  debt, rarely  accounted for as  such, that has 
grown to be approximately 40 percent as large as the explicit national 
debt. It is a large fraction of total compensation and a very different 
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over the employee’s working life in a pattern radically different from 
regular  salary and benefits.  It therefore may-indeed,  should-have 
considerable impact on recruitment and retention. Since the commit- 
ment of resources is so large, we should inquire whether they in fact 
result in their intended effect-and  whether similar impacts could be 
obtained at less cost to taxpayers. 
3.2  The Grace Commission Proposal 
The military retirement system has attracted widespread comment 
in recent  years, and many  have offered  suggestions about  how  the 
system might be altered. No major study, however, has proposed as 
sweeping a set of changes as that advanced by the Grace Commission- 
and no study has attracted as much attention or generated as intense 
a debate. 
The sections of the Grace Commission report on the MRS and the 
civil service retirement system are replete with commentary on how 
these public sector pension arrangements differ from those found in 
the private sector. The commission comments at length about the rel- 
ative expense of the system and about how it came to be so distinctive. 
The President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (PPSSCC) re- 
port argues (1984, p. 111-285)  that “liberal”  government pension sys- 
tems were introduced in the 1920s because of a perception that public 
sector wages were lower than those for comparable skill levels in the 
private sector. In the meantime, the PPSSCC report asserts, govern- 
ment and private sector wage Compensation differentials  have been 
eliminated or dramatically reduced, with no corresponding reduction 
in the government pension component. According to the Grace Com- 
mission, this represented an unseen but very dramatic shift upward in 
the total compensation offered to government employees relative to 
their private sector counterparts. 
The Grace Commission study team largely rejects the notion that 
the MRS should be viewed as a manpower management tool rather 
than as a retirement system per se (p. 111-298).  The PPSSCC report 
implicitly argues that military personnel apply relatively high discount 
factors to pension benefits that will be received long in the future. If 
taxpayers discount the anticipated costs less than recipients discount 
the benefits,  the provision  of  compensation in  the form of deferred 
pensions is inefficient indeed. The Grace Commission argues that “force 
management objectives could be better met by a combination of  ad- 
justments in other elements of the military compensation package, such 
as bonuses or salaries, and a revised retirement system” (p. III-298).’5 
If armed services personnel do not value deferred retirement benefits 
highly, then the current system (which puts over 30 percent of its total 
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attract and retain long-term employees) represents an enormous ded- 
ication of resources to little effect. The costs total about 7 percent of 
the defense budget; a material increase in the efficiency with which 
they are spent could result in a noticeable decrease in cost or increase 
in defense effectiveness. 
These arguments turn, however, on a number of poorly known pa- 
rameters of the retirement system. We  have only limited knowledge of 
the extent to which armed services personnel value deferred retirement 
benefits  relative  to current salary or in-kind benefit payments.  The 
Grace Commission proposals would represent a radical alteration of 
those benefits. They embody a sharply different conception of the value 
and impact of the retirement system as a retention incentive than that 
which underlies the current system. 
3.2.1  Proposed Changes 
The Grace Commission report suggests three basic types of modi- 
fications in MRS benefits. First, it proposes two changes in the benefits 
formula:  (1)  a reduction in  service-year credits from  2.5 percent  to 
about 2.1 percent per year; and (2) a change in the final salary base 
from a three-year to a five-year average. Reducing service-year credits 
has a straightforward impact-it  cuts benefits by a little over 15 percent 
for all recipients. Altering the salary base from an average of the highest- 
paid three years to the highest-paid five years is less easy to gauge. 
Since years are added into the average starting with the highest salaried 
years first, the addition of two more years to the average must reduce 
the benefits paid. The size of the reduction depends upon the rate of 
general schedule and longevity salary increases. If, for example, as the 
Office of the Actuary estimates, general schedule increases proceed at 
5.5 percent per year and longevity increases in the final years are about 
3.5 percent per year, then the average of the three last years of salary 
is about 92 percent of  salary in the last year, whereas the average of 
the last five years of salary is only about 85 percent of the last year’s 
salary. Thus, pension benefits based on a five-year final average will 
be only 85/92ds as large as if  they were based  on a three-year final 
average; pension benefits would be reduced by about 8 percent. These 
two proposed adjustments to the benefit formula together would reduce 
benefits by a little over 23 percent. 
The second modification proposed by  the Grace Commission is a 
change in the cost-of-living adjustments to pension benefits. Under the 
current system, pension benefits are fully indexed to changes in the 
CPI.16 The Grace Commission regards this as far too liberal an ad- 
justment and recommends instead that benefits after the age of sixty- 
two be indexed at only one-third the change in the CPI. The rationale 
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by Social Security payments, which are fully indexed. The Grace Com- 
mission sees no reason to have all of the package adjusted for inflation. 
This change would substantially reduce the value of pension benefits 
to be received. As an example, consider a sixty-two-year-old retiree 
who will live to be seventy-five. Suppose inflation proceeds at 5 percent 
per year and the real rate of time discount is 1 percent. A retiree starting 
in the current system with $1,000 per month will receive benefits worth, 
in present value terms, about $146,000. A retiree starting with the same 
amount under the system recommended by the Grace Commission will 
receive benefits worth only about $1 16,000-a  reduction of about 22 
percent. 
The  third-and  most  radical-modification  recommended  by  the 
Grace Commission would change the availability of benefits.  Under 
the current system, retirement benefits are available immediately upon 
attainment of twenty years of service. The Grace Commission proposes 
instead that a retirement annuity be available only on a deferred basis 
if the retiree is less than fifty-five years of age (which includes the vast 
majority of military retirees). A full annuity would be available at age 
sixty-two. Reduced benefits would be available at any time after age 
fifty-five, but with a penalty of 0.5 percent for each month before the 
age of sixty-two that the benefits are started. A crucial feature of this 
proposal is that the benefits would still be based on an average of the 
last five years of salary, without any adjustment for inflation. Thus, in 
the years following retirement and before retirement benefits begin, 
the value of  the annuity to be received would be eroded in real terms 
by continuing increases in the price level. The quadruple effects of (1) 
the deferral-having  to wait to receive the benefits, (2) the compres- 
sion-receiving  benefits for a shorter period, (3) the penalty-receiving 
reduced benefits if the annuity begins before age sixty-two, and (4) the 
erosion-receiving  benefits based on nominally denominated salaries 
paid in years long past, would dramatically reduce the value of pension 
benefits. 
As an example, consider a retiree attaining twenty years of service 
at age forty-two who will live to be seventy-five and who would start 
under the current system with a retirement benefit of $1,000 per month. 
Suppose that  inflation proceeds at 5 percent  annually  and that  the 
appropriate real discount rate is 1 percent. Under the current system, 
this retiree would receive benefits worth about $336,000. Under the 
Grace Commission proposal, he or she would have to wait until age 
fifty-five or later to begin collecting even reduced benefits (or until age 
sixty-two to receive benefits with no penalty). Supposing that he or 
she elects to receive  benefits  starting at age fifty-five, the  nominal 
benefit paid will  start at $1,000 per month, in spite of the fact that 
inflation has eroded the value of each of these dollars to about 53 cents. 62  Herman B. Leonard 
The value of benefits received would then be only about $39,000, even 
if  the benefits were fully indexed to inflation once they began. Under 
the Grace Commission proposal, benefits would in fact be fully indexed 
only until age sixty-two; thereafter they would be indexed only at one- 
third the change in the CPI, as previously  discussed. With these in- 
dexing provisions, the value of the benefits would be reduced to about 
$34,000. These proposed changes in the availability of benefits reduce 
the value of benefits for this hypothetical employee by over 85 percent. 
If  we  include  the proposed  change in the indexing of  benefits,  the 
reduction is by nearly 90 percent. The proposed alteration in the avail- 
ability of benefits is thus by far the most powerful of the modifications 
suggested by the Grace Commission. 
Figure 3.1  shows the effects of  the modifications proposed by the 
Grace Commission. The flows of benefit payments under both the ex- 
isting and the proposed system are shown in real terms. Thus the benefit 
flow under the current system is simply a level annuity from the date 
of  retirement (assumed to occur at age forty-three in this illustration) 
until death (assumed to occur at age seventy-five). The flow is fixed in 
real terms at the level given by 2.5  x  20, or 50 percent of  the three- 
year average of final salaries, which, under the assumptions used above, 
would be about 46 percent of salary in the final year. 
Under the Grace Commission proposal, by contrast, the benefit level 
is first pegged at 2.1  x  20  or 42  percent of the five-year average of 
final salaries, or about 35 percent of  salary in the final year. The pay- 
ments do not begin until twelve years later, however, and by then have 
Benefit 
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as o fraction 
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Fig. 3.1 
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Retirement  benefits under the existing MRS and under the 
Grace Commission proposal. 
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been eroded by inflation in real terms to a purchasing power equivalent 
of about 19 percent of final salary in the last working year. If benefits 
are elected at age fifty-five, they are reduced by 42 percent as a penalty 
for early retirement.  Payments thus start, in real terms, at about  11 
percent of final salary. They are then indexed fully for inflation during 
the next 7 years, until age 62,  where they begin to decline in real terms 
since they will be indexed at only one-third the rate of inflation. 
The result is that the annuity received under the Grace Commission 
proposals  (shown  in  real terms in fig.  3.1 by  the shaded region) is 
dramatically smaller than that under the present system. Moreover, it 
is received considerably later. In present value terms, the Grace Com- 
mission proposed retirement benefit is only a small fraction of  that 
available under the current system. Table 3.5 shows the value of ac- 
cumulated pension wealth under the Grace Commission proposals for 
our illustrative service member at various ages and under a variety of 
discount rate assumptions.  These figures are in  marked contrast to 
those for the current MRS, shown in table 3.3. For the early years after 
retirement eligibility at twenty years of service, accrued pension rights 
under the existing system are more than ten times greater than those 
under the Grace Commission proposals. 
The changes proposed by the Grace Commission are dramatic. Their 
adoption would be a wholesale overhaul of the existing MRS. They 
would substantially alter both its costs and its incentive structure. 
3.2.2  Impacts on Incentives 
The Grace Commission proposals would  substantially  realign the 
incentive structure built into the MRS. First, and most obvious, the 
Table 3.5  Value of Accrued Pension Rights under the Grace Commission 
Proposals, for the Illustrative Employee at Various Discount Rates 
and Ages 
Annual Discount Rates 







9  5  2  1 
23  13  6  3 
49  32  17  10 
76  52  31  19 
150  115  79  56 
195  155  113  84 
Source; Author’s calculations.  See text for assumptions. 
Notes; All figures are in thousands of  inflation-adjusted dollars. These figures give the 
value of pension accruals at various years in the employee’s career. They are denominated 
in real terms. They are reported  as present values in the years shown. 64  Herman B. Leonard 
provision of substantially smaller benefits might affect the recruitment 
of armed services employees interested in a long-term career. Second, 
the pattern of accruals to pension entitlements is considerably different 
under the Grace Commission proposals than under the existing MRS. 
The incentive effects of the Grace Commission proposals depend on 
the likely selection of the timing of benefit commencement by retirees 
if  the PPSSCC  suggestions are adopted. Under the proposed  rules, 
benefits will be available to retirees starting at age fifty-five, but only 
with a penalty of 0.5 percent per month below the benefit that would 
be payable at age sixty-two. However, if  benefits are elected early, 
they will be fully indexed until age sixty-two. Thus if  inflation is pro- 
ceeding rapidly enough, or if retirees discount future payments rapidly, 
then they will likely elect to begin their annuities as soon as possible. 
Table 3.6 shows the present value, measured at age fifty-five, of  the 
pension benefits received by a retiree, as a function of the elected date 
of commencement. The present value of benefits is reported in multiples 
of  the base annual amount of payment.  All  calculations are in real 
terms. In assessing these values, a real discount rate of  1 percent and 
an inflation rate of  5 percent are assumed. As table 3.6 makes clear, 
the value of pension benefits, assessed at age fifty-five, is considerably 
higher if  the retiree elects to receive them immediately than if  he or 
she defers them further, in  spite of the penalty  applied to payments 
that begin before age sixty-two. The value of an earlier, longer, more 
Table 3.6  Present Value of Pension Benefits Received from Annuities 
Starting at Alternative Ages under Grace Commission Proposed 
Rules 
Age at Start 
of  Annuity 
Age 55 Present Value 

















Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: All figures are multiples of base annuity amounts, shown in present value terms 
as of age 55. 
Assumptions: 
Retiree lives to age 75 
Inflation at 5 percent per year 
Real discount rate of 1 percent per year 
Full indexing from ages 55 to 62 
Indexing after age 62 at one-third of change in CPI 65  Debt and Structure of  Military Pensions 
inflation-adjusted pension is higher, even if it starts out at a lower level 
in nominal terms. Waiting from age fifty-five to sixty-two for the pension 
to begin reduces the total present value of  benefits received by nearly 
30 percent.  More rapid  inflation or a higher rate of discount would 
make these results even more dramatic, raising the value of annuities 
begun at an early age in comparison to those begun later. These results 
indicate that it is likely that virtually all retirees would elect to have 
their benefits begin at age fifty-five under the regime proposed by the 
Grace Commission. 
Under the presumption that retirees will elect annuities beginning at 
age fifty-five, we can readily compute the cost of pension obligations 
accrued during each service year. Table 3.7 shows the cost of base pay, 
other compensation, and pension compensation under the Grace Com- 
mission proposals at various ages for the same illustrative employee 
discussed earlier for the existing system. Once again, a real discount 
rate of  1 percent is used to evaluate the cost of benefits extended, on 
the theory that taxpayers should and do use a relatively low real rate 
of discount. 
As Table 3.7 indicates, pension compensation under the Grace Com- 
mission’s proposed rules accrues late in the employee’s working life, 
Table 3.7  Annual Cost of Base Pay, Other Compensation, and Pension 
Compensation, for an Illustrative Military Employee under Grace 
Commission Rules 
Pension  Total 
Age  Base Pay  Other Pay  Compensationa  Compensation 
22  15.0  5.3  0.0  20.3 
32  22.2  7.8  0.0 
33  23.1  8.1  1.9 
30.0 
33.0 
37  27.0  9.5  3.3  39.7 
42  32.9  11.5  6.4  50.8 
43  34.2  12.0  7.2  53.4 
44  35.5  12.4  8.2  56.2 
45  37.0  12.9  9.4  59.3 
46  38.4  13.5  10.6  62.5 
47  40.0  14.0  12.1  66.0 
48  41.6  14.6  13.7  69.8 
49  43.3  15.1  15.5  73.9 
50  45.0  15.7  17.5  78.3 
51  46.8  16.4  19.8  83.0 
52  48.7  17.0  22.4  88.1 
Source: Author’s calculations. See text for assumptions. 
Notes: All figures in thousands of inflation-adjusted dollars. These figures give the value 
of compensation in the year in which it is received. They are denominated in real terms. 
aAssumes a 1 percent real rate of discount to reflect government cost rather than value 
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with larger and larger accruals for continued years of  service beyond 
the twenty required for eligibility.” Thus the cost of  the pension com- 
ponent of employee compensation under the Grace Commission’s pro- 
posed regime is heavily stacked toward the later years of  work, as it 
is  under  the  existing  system. The commission  proposals,  however, 
apply considerably less resources in total and in a pattern somewhat 
later in the employee’s career than the current system. Table 3.8, which 
compares the Grace Commission pension compensation costs with those 
of the existing MRS for this illustrative employee, makes it clear that 
the Grace Commission pattern  tries to induce continued service by 
providing increasing resources each service year. 
Whether the  Grace Commission proposal  would  result  in  greater 
recruitment or retention of armed services personnel than the current 
system depends crucially on how benefits are viewed by recipients. 
Table 3.9 shows the value of pension benefits assessed at real rates of 
discount of  1, 3, 6, and 9 percent.  Under the proposed Grace Com- 
mission rules, the pension component of compensation provides a con- 
tinuing inducement to keep working, even if  the employee has a very 
high  real  discount  rate.  This is in  sharp contrast to the  incentives 
provided by the current MRS, which provides a positive inducement 
Table 3.8  Pension Compensation Costs by Age for Existing MRS and Grace 
Commission Proposal 
Age  Pension Compensation Costsa 











































Source: Author’s calculations.  See text for assumptions. 
Nores: All figures in thousands of inflation-adjusted dollars. These figures give the value 
of  compensation in the year in which it is received. They are denominated in real terms. 
aEvaluated at a  real  discount  rate of  1  percent to reflect  costs rather  than  value  to 
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Table 3.9  Value of Pension Compensation under Grace Commission Rules, 
for Illustrative Employee, Computed at Various Discount Rates 
Annual Discount Rate 
Age  .01  .03  .06  .09 
32  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
33  1.9  1  .o  0.4  0.2 
37  3.3  1.9  0.9  0.4 
42  6.4  4.2  2.3  1.3 
43  7.2  4.8  2.7  1.6 
44  8.2  5.6  3.2  1.9 
45  9.4  6.5  3.9  2.4 
46  10.6  7.5  4.6  2.9 
47  12.1  8.7  5.5  3.6 
48  13.7  10.0  6.5  4.4 
49  15.5  11.6  7.7  5.3 
50  17.5  13.4  9.2  6.5 
51  19.8  15.4  10.9  7.9 
52  22.4  17.8  12.9  9.7 
Source: Author’s calculations. See text for assumptions. 
Notes:  All figures in thousands of inflation-adjusted figures. These figures give the value 
of  compensation in the year in which it is received. They are denominated in real terms. 
to stop working in the years after eligibility is reached if the employee 
has a high real discount rate.I8 For sufficiently high rates of discount, 
the inducement to continue working is relatively slight, but the claim 
can at least be made  that additional  years of  work are increasingly 
rewarded under the Grace Commission rules; exactly the opposite is 
true under the existing MRS. On the other hand, the absolute incentive 
provided by pension accruals to continue working is much greater for 
the current system than under the Grace Commission rules if the em- 
ployee’s real discount rate is relatively low. 
3.2.3  Cost of the Grace Commission Military Pension System 
The modifications proposed by the Grace Commission would change 
the pension entitlements of current members of the MRS, in some cases 
dramatically. The modifications would have a material impact both upon 
the full funding rate of the system and upon its current unfunded lia- 
bilities.  Table 3.10 presents the results of  a simulation of the Grace 
Commission proposal under the actuarial and economic assumptions 
used for the simulation of  the existing MRS. Since the behavioral ex- 
perience  rates-rates  of  retirement,  separation, and  so on-are  as- 
sumed to be the same as in the baseline simulation, we are effectively 
assuming  that  the  Grace  Commission  modifications would  have  no 68  Herman B. Leonard 
Table 3.10  Grace Commission Simulation Results 
Present value of future benefits 
- Present value of future full funding 
$428.0 billion 
33.5 billion 
= Net unfunded liability 
i  Current annuitants and enrollees” 
394.5 billion 
3.4 million 
116 thousand  = Unfunded liability per member 
Full Funding Rate 
Disability 
Nondisability 





As Fraction of 




TOTAL  13.8  10.2 
Sources: Data: Department of Defense 1983; results: author’s calculations. 
Assumprions: Plan experience: as  reported by the Office of the Actuary. Rates of increase: 
CPI  = 5 percent; salaries-general  =  .05 percent, longevity from plan exp. Real rate 
of return on assets:  1 percent. 
”Excludes part-time drill reservists. 
impact upon retention of armed services employees.  l9 The Grace Com- 
mission proposes to phase in the new regime over the next decade; 
this phase-in period is modeled in the simulation presented here. 
In terms of annual costs, the contrast between the Grace Commission 
proposals and the existing MRS is marked. The full funding rate (as a 
fraction of BMC) is reduced under the Grace Commission suggestions 
to 10.2 percent from 42.7 percent-annual  costs of the retirement sys- 
tem are cut by three-quarters. The disability component of the system 
is hardly altered; the cut in the nondisability portion amounts to nearly 
85 percent. The Grace Commission proposals would dismantle the MRS 
as it has been known to date. These modifications would be equivalent 
in cost savings to a reduction of approximately  33 percent in  BMC. 
They thus would have have an impact roughly similar to a one-quarter 
reduction in the cost of the total military compensation package. 
In terms  of  accumulated debt, however,  the change is much less 
dramatic. The unfunded liability of the system is reduced by about $130 
billion, or by about one-quarter. While the present value of total benefits 
that will paid to existing annuitants and plan members drops by nearly 
$250 billion, over $100 billion is a reduction in  pension benefits that 
would have been earned in the future under the current system. Thus 
while it represents a considerable change in the current and future costs 
of  military compensation, the Grace Commission revision has a rela- 
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3.3  Conclusion 
The military retirement system represents a substantial commitment 
of future federal revenues. Current obligations exceed one-half trillion 
dollars, about 40 percent as much as the explicit national debt. The 
incremental obligation taken on each year has an equivalent current 
cost in excess of  40 percent  of  other military compensation and in 
excess of 55 percent of basic military wages. 
The MRS is explicitly not viewed by the armed services solely-r 
perhaps even largely-as  a device insuring the availability of retirement 
income to its veterans. Rather, it is viewed as one component of the 
recruitment and retention effort through which the services attempt to 
minimize the total cost of achieving a given level of defense effective- 
ness. The MRS is explicitly designed as part of  the incentive system 
to develop and keep long-term, high-skill employees for a career of 
appropriate length-and  then encourage them to retire. 
Viewed this way, the MRS represents an enormously expensive re- 
cruitment and retention effort. Military salaries in  1982 exceeded $27 
billion. The current equivalent cost of  associated pension obligations 
is in excess of $15 billion. It is difficult even to speculate about what 
impact funds of this magnitude, applied directly as current payments 
in a carefully designed and selective system of retention and re-enlistment 
bonuses, might have on the ability of the armed services to retain key 
personnel. 
Why  do we have this military compensation  system, with such a 
large fraction  of  the  payment  for  current  services  deferred,  to  be 
paid  out of  future revenues?  Several answers  are possible.  One  is 
that the system is an efficient accommodation between taxpayers and 
armed services personnel. For example, taxpayers might discount the 
future more than do pension  beneficiaries,  so a trade in which tax- 
payers pay later instead of currently is better for both parties. There 
may, however, be many inefficient reasons why taxpayers count these 
future  costs  less  than  the recipients  count  their  future gains.  One 
plausible hypothesis asserts that the costs are largely masked  from 
both current and future taxpayers through poor reporting.*O The re- 
porting  of  military pension  liabilities has  hardly  been  of  a form or 
volume designed to attract much attention from taxpayers. Moreover, 
the accrual of  military pension  obligations has not been  scrutinized 
as  a  use  of  Defense  Department  resources  to  the  same degree  as 
more direct expenditures.  Imagine a $15 billion line item in the De- 
fense Department budget for expenditures on recruitment and reten- 
tion; such a program would be very carefully examined. Few would 
be  prepared  to argue that  the  current MRS has  been  held  up to a 
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The Grace Commission proposes to rectify at least some part of this 
imbalance. Convinced that the MRS does little to retain or attract key 
personnel, the commission has argued for a wholesale revision of the 
system. The proposal begins with minor modifications of  the benefit 
formula, continues with an overhaul of the cost-of-living increases of- 
fered to annuitants, and finishes with a dramatic reduction in the im- 
mediacy of the availability of benefits. These revisions would reduce 
the cost to the  taxpayer  quite  substantially-by  as much  as three- 
quarters. But they would similarly reduce the value of benefits to re- 
cipients. Indeed, the value of benefits to recipients would be reduced 
by even more than the cost to taxpayers if recipients discount the future 
more than do taxpayers at large. 
It is tenable to contemplate the kind of  revisions suggested by the 
Grace Commission if we believe that armed forces personnel discount 
the future so much that they are largely uninterested in the generous 
pensions we currently provide them. In this case, the retirement ben- 
efits we pay for are wasted, and they should be substantially revamped 
because they are a large fraction of total compensation cost. But if  we 
believe that future pension recipients value their retirement income, 
then the very generosity of the current system argues that it cannot be 
scrapped without substantial impact. Little in the way of hard evidence 
guides us about the impacts of the MRS on retention.  This has led 
many to observe that the “serious reforms” of the MRS proposed by 
the Grace Commission may be neither serious nor reforms. 
In the absence of strong evidence suggesting that the real discount 
rates used by armed services personnel-to  assess vital long-term life 
income questions such as the value of pension benefits-are  quite high, 
wholesale revision of  such a sizable component of the military com- 
pensation system as the current retirement system is a risky course. 
On the other hand, the enormous costs of the current system-and  the 
likelihood that we would look more carefully for benefits from this 
system if  we were collectively more aware of its costs-call for sub- 
stantially  more  attention  than  we  have been  giving to whether  this 
component of the Defense Department budget is cost-effective. 
Notes 
I am grateful for the support of the National Bureau Public Sector Payrolls 
Study. Members of that study and of the NBER Pensions Study have provided 
helpful comments  and encouragement.  Maj.  Henry  A. Leonard provided a 
wealth of clarifying facts and observations as well as helpful editorial sugges- 
tions. Monica Friar provided expert research assistance in  tracking down the 71  Debt and Structure of Military Pensions 
relevant data and in modifying a general pension simulation model to capture 
the intricacies of the military retirement system. Maria Hanratty, who has been 
engaged in independent  research on some of these questions, has helped me 
understand the military retirement system and the Grace Cornmission proposals 
to modify it. Susan Bender contributed excellent editorial assistance; she would 
be  the first to criticize the convoluted  phraseology  and  punctuation  of  this 
sentence. 
1. Some would question the word obligation or debt as used here, arguing 
that there is no contract to pay pensions, so the nation  can repudiate them 
readily  if  it  chooses to.  This  argument  misses  the crucial  point  that these 
promises are backed by a very considerable voting lobby. Moreover, the system 
has been in place in its current form for long enough to embody an implicit 
promise to current members of the armed forces. It is hard to believe that they 
would all continue to serve if  the system were suddenly changed. 
2.  Congress has recently moved to recognize these costs more directly in 
the federal budget,  starting in FY  1985, through accounting for the MRS on 
an accrual basis. The system remains unfunded,  however, and little attention 
has so far been paid to annual MRS costs. 
3. The history of the MRS is described concisely by the Office of the Actuary 
(Department of Defense 1983). Additional detail can be found in Glasson 1968. 
4. The retirement  annuity for those who entered before September 1980 is 
not subject to averaging; it is based solely on salary in the final year. 
5. As a matter of policy, these adjustments are still being granted. But Con- 
gress has deferred or reduced them in several instances since 1982. 
6. Starting in FY 1985, accrual basis entries indicating the annual cost of the 
MRS are included in the budget. The system remains unfunded, however. 
7.  In making this computation, a fair rate of return is first allowed  on the 
existing pension wealth from the preceding year. The excess in the change in 
pension wealth over the normal rate of return on the existing amount is con- 
sidered pension compensation in that year. This adjustment is made because 
to maintain its value without any payment being made against it, the current 
pension wealth must be considered  as accruing interest at the normal rate of 
return for riskless assets (here taken as 1 percent in real terms). 
8. With the exception  of  very  senior officers  and enlisted  personnel, the 
military requires retirement after the thirtieth year. 
9. The appropriate estimate of the discount rate used  by  armed  services 
members is the subject of continuing debate. A number of studies have found 
personal  discount rates in excess of  10 percent. Most are based on research 
designs that assume individuals can readily compute the impacts of taxes and 
compound interest on the value of alternative packages of compensation. Most 
seem to have confused their survey participants about how they were supposed 
to treat inflation-that  is, whether they were answering questions about nom- 
inal or real interest rates. Many observers regard these estimates as unreal- 
istically high. Nonetheless, they have been used in a number of military man- 
power studies, including the Fifth Quadrennial Review of  Military Compensation 
(Department of Defense 1984) and a recent study by the Congressional Budget 
Office. See Congressional Budget Office 1984 and Black  1983. 
10. Some recent studies, including the Fifth Quadrennial Review of  Military 
Compensation (QRMC V) and the Grace Commission report, have either im- 
plicitly or explicitly  used  even higher discount  rates than this.  It is hard to 
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of the rates they can reasonably expect to earn on their investments. In par- 
ticular, it is hard to explain why, if  their discount rates are so high, they save 
at all. 
11. A common alternative  funding approach recognizes as pension obliga- 
tions  only  the present value  of  benefits  already earned and  credited. This 
method, known as the accrued benefits method, does not seem appropriate as 
a means of valuing MRS obligations. It would recognize no obligation to armed 
services personnel until they reach their twentieth  year of service because  if 
they separate before that time they would receive no benefits. Since remaining 
in the service is largely at the discretion of the employee, and since very large 
pension benefits are provided when twenty years of service are attained, it is 
only reasonable to recognize the statistical obligation to employees with fewer 
than twenty years of service. The accrued benefits approach may be sensible 
for private sector plans where employees still serve at the will of the employer, 
but it does not appear to be a very accurate way to value public sector plans. 
And even in the private sector, the “at will”  labor contract is an endangered 
species being modified by court action and common practice. Employers with 
complete freedom to dismiss workers are rare indeed. 
12. The rate of inflation enters only through the averaging of the final three 
years of  salary, which is carried out in  nominal terms. It is also relevant  if 
Congress continues to withhold or delay or reduce cost-of-living adjustments. 
13. The rate of conversion assumed a marginal income tax rate of 30 percent. 
14. A common criticism of  the MRS (as well as other federal retirement 
plans) is that its benefits are too generous largely because they are fully indexed 
to the cost of living. About two-fifths of the cost of the MRS is due to its cost- 
of-living protection; in the absence of  any cost-of-living  increases, it would 
still have a funding rate over 30 percent of basic pay. 
15. In computing its estimates of cost savings from the changes it suggests, 
however, the PPSSCC report proposes to add very little in the way of recruit- 
ment or retention resources to offset the effects of the changes it recommends 
in  the MRS.  The report presents no systematic evidence about what bonus 
and  salary package would  be required  to offset the effects of  the proposed 
changes, or estimates of what such a package would cost. 
16. This is not entirely automatic. Since  1982 Congress has delayed or re- 
duced several scheduled MRS cost-of-living adjustments. 
17. Other proposed changes would institute vesting at ten years of  service 
instead of  twenty  so that smaller pensions  could  be received  by  employees 
with even  shorter working careers. But the low benefit credits and the long 
deferral before benefits would be received make these claims of little value. 
18. The Grace Commission proposed  rules  differ  in this  respect because 
while a higher discount rate reduces the value of  the pension benefits  to be 
received, they are deferred at least to age fifty-five, regardless of the date of 
retirement. Raising the discount rate reduces the value of the pension for early 
retirement more  than  for later retirement and leaves  a positive  accrual  to 
pension claims from work in the later years of the career. 
19. Since part of  the point of the analysis is to see whether a large impact 
upon  retention  is  likely  to be  observed if  these changes  are adopted, this 
assumption is undesirable. Unfortunately, we currently lack any credible way 
to estimate effects on retirement rates. 
20. The recent change to accrual accounting in the budget may improve this. 73  Debt and Structure of Military Pensions 
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Comment  Harvey S. Rosen 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide analytical descriptions of the military pension 
system. In general, one should expect two things of such papers. First, 
they  should  use the  available  data  to present  the  facts  clearly  and 
interestingly.  Second, they  should  whet  our  appetites  for  more  re- 
search. That is, the  presentation  of facts  should  suggest interesting 
puzzles that cannot be solved without  more theoretical or statistical 
Harvey  S. Rosen is professor  of  economics  at Princeton  University  and a research 
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analysis. Both chapters succeed at these tasks. In these comments I 
briefly summarize the main facts and discuss some of the puzzles they 
suggest. 
Chapter 2. Phillips and Wise 
Phillips and Wise focus on the lifetime compensation of  military 
personnel and “comparable” civilians. Economists who set out to com- 
pare the compensation of individuals in different occupations in a given 
year, let alone over a lifetime, are well aware that many assumptions 
are required. A standard approach is to estimate a regression of com- 
pensation on various personal and job characteristics for each of  the 
groups under consideration and then to compare the results. (The stan- 
dard method is not without problems. Issues of selectivity, bias, omitted 
variables, etc. often arise.) As long as the list of regressors includes 
an experience variable, (or some other regressor that changes with 
time), the estimates can also be used to generate an age-earnings profile. 
This procedure is not available to Phillips and Wise because they did 
not have access to microdata on the economic and demographic char- 
acteristics of military personnel. Therefore, civilian and military people 
are compared without holding most of their “characteristics” constant. 
In particular, the comparisons are over all jobs and all firm sizes. In 
this context, it is important to note that Phillips and Wise focus virtually 
all their attention on the pecuniary aspects of the compensation bundle, 
that is, salaries and pensions. Phillips and Wise are sensitive to these 
limitations;  still, we must keep them in mind when reviewing the results. 
Some of the interesting facts that emerge are: 
-The  nonsalary components of  compensation are very different in 
the two sectors. 
-When  enlisted persons are compared to civilians who have com- 
pleted high  school, it turns out that for about twenty years, the re- 
muneration is about the same. After the twenty-year point, however, 
the military people are much better paid because of pensions that be- 
come available at that time. 
-Enlisted  persons have lifetime compensation packages (i.e., salary 
plus pensions) that are 1.35 to 1.68 times higher than civilians with high 
school educations. When officers are compared to civilians with a col- 
lege diploma, the comparable ratios are 1.61 to 1.93. Thus the potential 
compensation associated with a military career is substantially greater 
than that associated with a civilian career. 
-A  large peak in military separation rates occurs at twenty years 
of service. Thus the military pension system appears to provide a strong 
incentive to retire, at least  if  the inducement of  currently  available 
benefits is not offset by increases in pension wealth that would result 
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I found Phillips and Wise’s characterization of the status quo con- 
vincing (subject to the data problems noted above) and have just a few 
comments on their procedure: 
-Most  of  the discounting in the chapter assumes a 3 percent real 
discount rate. Unlike Leonard’s chapter, not much sensitivity analysis 
is done to see whether different values would affect substantive results 
very much. Probably not much would change, but the exercise would 
make the results even more convincing. 
-The  salary figures do not take into account the personal income 
tax. To  the extent that marginal tax rates are not constant and the 
income streams have different patterns, this could make a difference. 
-The  chapter observes that only 60 percent of the employees in the 
private sector have pensions. It is not clear, however, what we are to 
make of this observation. Does it mean that the military-civilian dif- 
ferentials estimated by Phillips and Wise are underestimates of the true 
values? Or does it mean that in the civilian  jobs without pensions, there 
is an increase in salary to make up for lower pension benefits? 
-To  make the analysis of civilian income streams more realistic, Phil- 
lips and Wise assume that the typical civilian makes two job changes. 
How was this figure chosen? Is there any optimization story behind it? 
Some of the topics for future research suggested by the chapter are: 
-What  would happen to the results if a more careful job were done 
of holding “worker quality” fixed? 
-Can  any of the differences between military and civilian compen- 
sation be explained by compensating differentials? Do differences in 
personal freedom, hours of work, and/or potential hazards account for 
any of the pay differential? Can a compensating differentials framework 
help  account for the larger  difference  between  officers and college 
graduates than that between enlisted men and high school graduates? 
Phillips and Wise hint that differences in ability may be greater in the 
college civilian versus officer comparison, but perhaps the nonpecu- 
niary aspects of  military employment matter more to those who have 
had a college education. 
-At  the time of entry into the military, is the value of the pension 
to be  received  twenty years in  the future understood? If  the dollar 
amount is known, what discount rate do individuals apply in  finding 
its present value. Unfortunately, I cannot think of a way to examine 
both questions simultaneously. 
-If  differences between remuneration are not due to compensating 
differentials, and if  the abilities required for the two types of jobs are 
indeed comparable, then one would expect to observe queues to enter 
the military. Are there data on excess supply (e.g. ,  number of rejected 
applications) that could be used to improve our understanding of these 
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Chapter 3. Leonard 
Many  of  the  same issues that  came up  in  the  Phillips and Wise 
Chapter also arise here, so my discussion can be a bit briefer. 
Leonard discusses some of the same “facts”  as Phillips and Wise, 
but packages the results slightly differently, so they are useful to read. 
Compared to Phillips and Wise, however, Leonard puts less emphasis 
on comparisons of military and civilian sectors, and more on simulating 
the effects of possible changes in the military retirement system. Also, 
Leonard explores some implications of the fact that the military pension 
system is unfunded. In effect, then, the obligations that taxpayers owe 
to current and future military retirees as a consequence of  services 
they have already rendered are part of the national debt. Leonard finds 
that this component of the national debt is large even compared to the 
conventionally measured national debt. 
Some of the important results reported by Leonard are: 
-A  substantial fraction of  the cost of  compensation for long-term 
armed services personnel is incurred in the last years of their careers. 
-The  value of the military pension is quite sensitive to changes in 
the value of the discount rate. This finding is important given that on 
the basis of previous research, we know very little about the magnitudes 
of personal discount rates. (Certain human capital and permanent-income 
hypothesis models allow investigators to estimate discount rates; the 
results tend to vary substantially across studies and to be larger than 
one would guess.) 
-For  all “reasonable” discount rates, the present value of the pen- 
sion received at twenty years is large. Even with a 6 percent real interest 
rate, the pension plan is equivalent to a $200,000 bonus. However, the 
lucrativeness of staying in the military past the twenty-year point is 
sensitive to the discount rate. 
-To  fund the military retirement  system on a current basis,  one 
would require a funding rate of 58 percent of basic pay. In the civilian 
sector, the comparable figure is 10 percent to 20 percent. 
-If  the changes suggested by the Grace Commission were imple- 
mented, the present value of military pension benefits would fall by 
between 85 percent and 90 percent. 
Leonard’s chapter raises some interesting questions: 
-1s  the  fact that military pensions are part  of  the national  debt 
perceived  by  citizens  in the rational  way  suggested by  (say) Barro 
(1974)? Will macroeconomists who put the national debt in their regres- 
sions get better fits if they include the unfunded military pension com- 
ponent? If  people currently unaware of the existence of  the military 
pension debt begin to become aware of it through publicity, what will 
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-What  effect would the Grace Commission recommendations have 
upon retirement decisions in the military? 
-Leonard  is more adventuresome than Phillips and Wise in spec- 
ulating about why the system looks the way it does. His speculations 
suggest some questions: 
(a)  What is the purpose of the military retirement system? The claim 
is that it develops and keeps long-term, high-skill employees. Is this 
the right goal? If so, is the current system an efficient way to achieve 
it? 
(b)  As a political issue, how did the system get this way? Is it solely 
a device to fool taxpayers into underestimating military compensation 
costs? Or is the system, because of differing discount rates between 
military and civilian persons, an efficient way to structure compensa- 
tion? What are the political coalitions behind the system? 
(c)  A further political  question is  raised  by the key  role  that the 
inflationary erosion of pension benefits plays in the recommendations 
of the Grace Commission. Why does money illusion seem to play such 
an important role in attempts to change public policy? 
Conclusion 
In conclusion I want to stress how beneficial it is to have these two 
chapters lay out the basic issues in such a clear way. My guess is that 
we will see a good deal of sophisticated econometric work to answer 
many of the puzzles that have been raised in these two chapters. How- 
ever, if  the literature on the behavioral effects of the Social Security 
system is any guide, there is a good chance that as a group, these future 
papers are going to be inconclusive.  My guess is that researchers in 
this field will continue to refer to these two chapters for their cogent 
and useful analyses. 
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